Goodbye for now

This post marks the end of this series on my blog. I hope you have enjoyed reading my analysis of the nuclear debate, and hopefully learned something you didn’t already know.

From what I have read and seen this semester, the nuclear debate is alive and well, even after 70-odd years. What seems to be happening is a move away from a logical debate, and a move towards a debate that is based purely on ideology and emotional arguments.

All is not lost however, there has been a shift in the last decade or so, that seems to be getting stronger, to re-frame the nuclear debate in terms of climate change. Instead of now just being a debate over whether we should use nuclear technology, it is now a debate over what is the better solution to the issue of fossil fuels, renewables or nuclear (or both?).

Hopefully in the future, some form of compromise can be reached, or at least maybe the debate will start to again have a more logical tone, with facts rational points becoming more common (and not doubt making the debate more productive).

Unfortunately, from what I have seen, while you have corporations like Greenpeace dominating the conversation we are not going to see any movement. Greenpeace takes a firm stand, and is not willing to compromise, as such, there is not going to be any valuable discussion, while one of the sides sticks its fingers in its ears.

So, this is where I leave the conversation. It’s not over forever, I will definitely be picking this blog up in the future once this semester’s work has been done. I think it will cover broader, more diverse topics, generally related to science or science communication. Hopefully it will continue to interest some people.

Say something controversial.

Matt

Change in the air for Australia?

So yesterday I stumbled on this article from the SMH, which is talking about Australia’s new Chief Scientist, Alan Finkel. Recently annoucned, Dr. Finkel will be moving into the position in 2016. The main point of this article is a couple of statements made by Dr. Finkel regarding Australia’s use of coal, and the need to move towards a carbon-free energy system.

His position seems to be that that we should transition to entirely renewable energy, but that nuclear should ‘absolutely be considered’. Both parts of these comments are very good to hear, not only is there now a voice that will push seriously for renewable energy, it is also a pragmatic voice that is OK with using nuclear power as an interim, low-carbon, constant supply energy source.

At this point it is really quite shocking that Australia hasn’t moved towards using nuclear energy. Of all the countries in the world, we are perhaps one of the best suited for nuclear energy: we have an incredible amount of empty land, that is currently going unused, far away from any people and any risk of accidental health effects (which is also a good place to store any waste); we are right in the middle of a tectonic plate and as such do not suffer from frequent earthquakes that can damage nuclear reactors (I’m looking at you Japan); and we have 31% of the world’s uranium, an incredibly valuable resource that we currently make no use of.

It is becoming a little frustrating to live in Australia at the moment, around the world we see huge developments and steps forward towards combating climate change, from China’s push to build nuclear reactors, to the recent announcement of the world’s largest solar array being built in Morocco. Something has got to give soon, but we are already too late.

Say something controversial.

Matt

The cost of nuclear power

So far in this blog, I have talked about a lot of the points that both sides use to ‘defeat’ those they campaign against. One point that I haven’t really touched on yet is point that comes up in a most, if not all, debates about the efficacy of nuclear power and that is the issue of cost. I want to preface this blog post by saying that I am really not a financial expert, and I am only drawing my opinion from what I have read, but I’m going to do my best to summarise the different points. Both sides claim to better understand the cost of nuclear power better than their opponents, and there is definitely a lot of hearsay involved.

On one side, you have the anti-nuclear movement, who all claim that the cost of building and running a safe nuclear power plant, as well as the associated waste management costs (there are many examples, here’s one) are far to high to justify the potential risks and are more unsustainable than getting the same energy from renewables.

On the other side, you have the pro-nuclear movement. This side is a bit harder to tease apart because, aside from the voices of a few loud eco-modernists, the majority of those who campaign for nuclear power have some form of vested interest (while this is true with the anti’s with renewables, it is less direct). But the substantive force of this side’s argument is that nuclear is more expensive than coal, but is competitive with renewables and able to perform at a high capacity in a shorter amount of time than other non-fossil fuels. However a fair point should be made that, unlike the anti’s, the pro’s acknowledge the difficulties of their technologies (most renewables-only campaigners seem to gloss over the shortcomings of current technologies)

As it says in this great article from The Conversation:

What is the economic cost of nuclear power? That turns out to be a very difficult question to answer.

The main problem seems to be that there is no good models on which to base an estimation of cost. The vast majority of in-service nuclear reactors at the moment were built in the heyday of nuclear power back around the 1960s. Add to that increasing delays for safety certification, as well as new projects with unexpected delays, like the (much safer) EPR design being built in Finland that is five years overdue, and you get investors with not much faith in projected ROIs and a general lack of faith in the affordability of nuclear power in general.

A point none of this addresses is the fact that we are going to have to make economic sacrifices in the long term (and probably in the short term as well) if we are going to have any hope of combating climate change. Can nuclear be part of the solution? Hopefully, one day we’ll figure it out.

Say something controversial.

Matt

‘Perception of risk’ by Paul Slovic, Part 3: So how do we communicate risk then?

The last part in my discussion of ‘Perception of Risk’, by Paul Slovic

At the core of why people don’t agree on risk is the difference between how the experts and the lay public understand risk. To the experts, risk is most often boiled down (too far) to metrics like ‘expected annual mortality’, which are figures that allow easy comparison, and seem (to the well-informed experts) to be able to perfectly communicate how risky an activity is. The is in direct contrast with the way the lay public understands and come to understand risk. To try and communicate risk based solely on facts ignores the context in which a lay person will be receiving those facts, the inputs and preconceived ideas that that person has already dealt with, and the emotional understanding already in place.

At the end of the paper, Slovic attempts to address the looming question that hangs over the whole paper, after taking all this information on board, is it actually possible to communicate risk effectively? One methods that is put forward (based on the transmission, lecture style of science communication) is to put the risk level in a way that the lay public can understand.

One really good example of this type of communication comes from Dr. Derek Muller on the Veritasium channel on YouTube:

This is a really digestible example of the use of qualitative risk to demonstrate the relative danger. But Slovic says that this is not enough, (agreeing with the current trend of science communication) what needs to be done is to have ‘two-way’ communication, instead of one-way. As enjoyable as the video is, it highlights how the theme that runs through most of the videos on Veritasium can be applied to other topics. In Veritasium, Dr. Muller attempts to break down peoples preconceived ideas about how physics works, and to help people understand that using human intuition to understand complex topics is often not enough, because they don’t operate in a way our relatively simply brain can understand. I think this thought can be applied to communication as well, human society has grown to the point where our ancestral ability to socialise and gossip doesn’t cut it when it comes to understanding how large groups of people will react to and understand certain information.

To really get the message of risk communication across, a two-way dialogue needs to be started. A dialogue that takes into account the facts, but also the the lived experience of the lay public. Interestingly, at the end of the paper Slovic makes the statement that the lay public is actually better than the experts at understanding the broader consequences of these sort of events, and as such, it seems to me that the onus is on the experts to defend themselves to the public, rather than hand down wisdom from above.

Say something controversial.

Matt

‘Perception of risk’ by Paul Slovic, Part 2: What factors influence risk perception?

Back to Slovic

There are several factors that have been identified as having the biggest impacts on the perception of risk: control, familiarity, catastrophic potential, and level of knowledge available to non-experts. Nuclear power, unfortunately, ticks most of these boxes for a majority of the lay public, and this makes it extremely difficult to communicate the actual risks.

It seems to me that these influencing factors can also work in the other direction. Take ‘familiarity’ for example. When the atomic age was first under way, there was probably a reasonable good ‘popular science’ understanding of the way that nuclear power worked, and this familiarity probably helped encourage the growth of the nuclear industry — with support rallied by events like the ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech — and acceptance in the wider public sphere (aside from a vocal minority). But this familiarity has come back in another form, familiarity with the disaster narrative. When people think of nuclear power now, the unerringly refer to events like Chernobyl, the disaster has become the familiar, which in turn seems to push the perception of the risk of nuclear events higher and higher.

Another factor that comes into perception of risk, is what Slovic calls the ‘signal potential’ of an incident. This refers to the capability of a single incident of imply further and more far-reaching impacts of the accident. The example he used was that of the difference of a trainwreck and a nuclear disaster like what happened at Three Mile Island. Hundreds of people may be killed in the trainwreck but, because it is a supposedly ‘closed’ event, there will be little alarm in the wider public. Compare this however, with Three Mile Island. No one was killed as a result of that accident, and the wider consequences were relatively minor, from a human health standpoint (not to belittle the suffering of those that were affected). And yet, the public reaction to the event was wildly over the top, and from here came the majority of the costs of Three Mile Island, the huge public backlash caused massive increases in regulations and the requirements for building nuclear reactors (which massively increases costs, and makes nuclear less competitive), but also in the massive financial and social losses sf the companies involved, but also the communities around Three Mile Island, which suffered under the weight of the negative image of the area.

So is it actually possible to communicate risk effectively? I’ll talk about that in the next post…

Say something controversial.

Matt

‘Perception of risk’ by Paul Slovic, Part 1: How do people process risk?

I was recently put on to an important research paper by Universal Genes, “Perception of Risk” by Paul Slovic. This paper is a review of the literature (at the time) surrounding the public perception of risk, and how the public comes to its opinion on how risky a technology or event is. Because so much is covered by this paper, I’m going to do a couple of blog posts on it, just so I can do it justice.

This first post is more about some of the big take home messages of the paper, about how the public perceives risk, the next couple of posts will be more about specific aspects of the issue.

An important part of understanding the perception of risk is how people come to accept it. Society, when asked, rates the risk for all activities as too high. But if the technology or activity is seen as being ‘highly beneficial’ then the risks are tolerated. Some early research indicated that the voluntary nature of risk is one of the most important factors in people’s perception of how risky it is. People were found to be 1000 times more likely to find a risk acceptable if they see the action as voluntary.

To understand better how people perceive different technologies, and how this affects the level of risk perceived, a study was conducted. Risks were compared based on how highly they rated on two scales: how unknown the technology was, and how much dread the technology inspired. The ‘unknown’ factor is based on how delayed adverse events could be from a certain event or technology (which no doubt creates the arguments against GMOs, as there is always the question of ‘how do we know if wont affect us in however many years). The ‘dread’ factor came from how likely people though the technology could result in a catastrophic mishap, lack of control, potential fatalities and the inequitable distribution of risk. In the groups of people interviewed, the ‘dread’ factor was seen to be most important in a persons perception of the risk involved.

Technologies like nuclear power scored highly on both scales. When the technologies that were rates were analysed for how much regulation there was on them, there is a clear relationship between how high they scored on both scales. The higher the dread or uncertainty, the more likely that they would be highly regulated (or that there would be loud calls for more regulation, see nuclear power and GMOs).

Fear of the unknown seems to be playing a big role here, and Slovic goes in to a lot of detail about the factors that influence risk perception. I’ll cover that in the next post.

Say something controversial.

Matt

Nuclear power and climate change

One of the main points of contention in the nuclear power debate is the use of nuclear power as tool to fight climate change.

On one side you have the proponents of nuclear power, who bill it as a stable, low-carbon energy source, that is available at all times of day, with minimal carbon output, high cost-efficiency and established technology.

On the other side you have the anti-nuclear movement, who say that nuclear power is a stopgap, ‘bandaid’ technology, that comes with too many health and safety risks, that is slow to build and in the end puts out as much carbon, because it takes so much industry to build the plants and store the spent fuel.

What the anti-nuclear movement would have is an immediate transition to renewable energy sources like wind, solar and geothermal, where available. The reaction of nuclear proponents is that these technologies are either restricted to certain parts of the world (like geothermal), take up far more land area than a similar capacity nuclear plant (like solar), or are intermittent and that there isn’t the technology to store captured energy (like wind and solar).

The problem is, is that there are ‘experts’ on both sides of the debate, who seem to be able to find information to support their own arguments while disproving their opponents. Also, any organisations weighing in on the debate tend to get ignored due to perceived conflicts of interest.

Even the IPCC is not above the squabbles of the nuclear debate, as outlined in this article, the position of the IPCC regarding nuclear power has varied greatly over time. In the first IPCC report, nuclear was listed as an important tool in creating a low-carbon energy system, then over then next five reports, the opinion veers away from nuclear until the most recent report, where it is again being encouraged as a pragmatic option while the technology needed to make renewables more reliable is developed. Much of this wavering seems to be related to the public opinion of nuclear power in the EU, which reflects the impact the nuclear debate can have on supposedly independent bodies.

Somehow — and I’m really not sure how — something needs to give in this debate, there needs to be some sort of consensus. While there is still all this indecision around nuclear, little work is going to be done on increasing our nuclear energy generating capacity. Maybe if both sides of the debate worked together instead, there would be progress in some direction.

Say something controversial.

Matt